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HIGH WALL OR LINES OF SEPARATION?
James J. Knicely"
The issue of religion and the role it should play in government has long
evoked spirited debate. Recently, an argument has been made that the "sep-
aration" between religion and politics has played a large factor in what
many consider to be our nation's "moral decay. " Such an argument, how-
ever, is not new.
In reviewing Religion and Politics in the Early Republic: Jasper Adams
and the Church-State Debate, edited by Daniel L. Dreisbach, James Knicely
examines the power of elected government to act benevolently toward reli-
gion and the moral values associated with it in light of today's social ills.
Religion and Politics in the Early Republic includes a noted sermon given
by Jasper Adams in the 1800s. Knicely establishes that among the four
"interests" Jasper Adams conceived as important to an understanding of
American culture, religion was the most important. At the time Adams made
such an argument, Adams believed that a growing indifference to Christian
values in America's political institutions threatened the foundation of civil
society. Knicely also examines the reaction that Jasper Adams's viewpoint
evoked from other scholars and statesmen, such as James Madison, John
Marshall, and Joseph Story, thus providing a unique look at the opinions
regarding religion and government among the generation that produced the
First Amendment. Knicely then poses the idea that Jasper Adams could be
correct; instead of turning to money and welfare programs to solve a "mor-
al decay" crisis, it might be more helpful to encourage religious and moral
values.
Now there are two ways, and two ways only by which men
can be governed in society; the one by physical force; the
other by religious and moral principles pervading the com-
munity, guiding the conscience, enlightening the reason,
softening the prejudices, and calming the passions of the
multitude.'
Principal, Knicely & Cotorceanu, P.C., Williamsburg, Virginia. B.A., George
Washington University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
' JASPER ADAMS, THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1833)
[hereinafter RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY], reprinted in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Freedom and order in any society are measured by the balance society
strikes between an imposed social order and one that arises from adherence
to shared values. This truth has become painfully evident in recent years,
most notably in the former Soviet Union, where newfound freedoms are
threatened by an epidemic of lawlessness in the wake of totalitarianism.2
The United States has experienced its own problems with lawlessness. As
Professor James Q. Wilson recently observed in the Harvard Godkin lec-
tures:
Many Americans worry that the moral order that once held
the nation together has come unraveled. Despite freedom and
prosperity-or worse, perhaps because of freedom and pros-
perity-a crucial part of the moral order, a sense of personal
responsibility, has withered under the attack of personal self-
indulgence.... High rates of crime, the prevalence of drug
abuse and the large number of fathers who desert children
and women who bore them all support the popular belief that
responsibility has given way to selfishness.'
Over 150 years ago, there arose a similar lament. It was not, so much as
today, about the harvest of crime and social decadence, but about the per-
ceived state hostility to religion and how it might undermine the moral order
and produce adverse social conditions. In 1833, Jasper Adams, one time
President of the College of Charleston (South Carolina), some time profes-
sor of moral and political philosophy at Brown University, and a member of
the Adams family of Massachusetts, published a sermon to the 1833 Con-
vention of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the South Carolina Diocese
entitled The Relation of Christianity to Civil Government in the United
States. The sermon and accompanying notes were widely circulated among
the intellectual and governing elites in America. It provoked significant
commentary from statesmen such as John Marshall, Joseph Story, and James
Madison, as well as critical review in the American Quarterly Review-all
EARLY REPUBLIC: JASPER ADAMS AND THE CHURCH-STATE DEBATE 39, 51 (Daniel
Dreisbach ed., 1996) [hereinafter RELIGION AND POLITICS].
2 See generally Richard C. Visek, Creating the Ethnic Electorate Through Legal
Restorationism: Citizen Rights in Estonia, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315 (1997); Gennady L.
Lezikov, Statistical Information on Crime and Its Use in Crime Control, presented at
the Ninth United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Officers, Cairo, Egypt, Apr. 29-May 8, 1995, at 1-2 ("Crime became one of the major
destabilizing factors of social development [in the former Soviet Union], its scale
reached a threshold posing a real threat to the safety of the state and to realization of
socioeceonomic reforms.").
3 JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 1 (1997).
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of which are included in a new book, Religion and Politics in the Early
Republic: Jasper Adams and the Church-State Debate,4 edited by Daniel L.
Dreisbach.5 The book makes available the full text of Adams's sermon and
the diverse commentary it provoked. It also provides a unique glimpse of
the various opinions concerning religion and government among the gen-
eration that produced the First Amendment. In making these historical
sources available and in his exposition of their significance, Dreisbach re-
minds us of Oliver Wendell Holmes's oft-quoted aphorism that "[a] page of
history ... is worth a volume of logic."6
I. ADAMS'S THESIS
It is generally recognized that the early leaders of our country "shared
the conviction that 'true religion and good morals are the only solid founda-
tion of public liberty and happiness."' 7 Indeed, "[t]he Founders ... ac-
knowledged that the republic rested largely on moral principles derived from
religion."' In the 1820-30s, however, the federal government began aban-
doning past sympathies to religion. The ascension of populist Andrew Jack-
son to the Presidency brought anti-establishment views to the fore. Jackson's
abandonment of the issuance of religious proclamations by the federal gov-
ernment and his strong opposition to the popular campaign to forbid Sunday
mail delivery were perceived as political atheism and antireligious secular-
ism.9 Compounding this perception, Thomas Jefferson stepped forward to
challenge the widely and largely unquestioned view that Christianity was
part of the common law.' ° As an educator and clergyman, Jasper Adams
observed this growing indifference to Christian values in America's political
institutions. These provocations challenged Adams to explicate the historical
4 See RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note -1.
' Associate Professor of Justice, Law & Society, School of Public Affairs, Ameri-
can University; B.A., University of South Carolina at Spartanburg; J.D., University of
Virginia; D.Phil., Oxford University.
6 RELIGION AND PoLITIcs, supra note 1, at xi (citing New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
" City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2185 (1997) (O'Connor J., dissenting).
"[T]he climate of the American revolutionary period, including the period of constitu-
tional development, was fundamentally religious." Charles Fahy, Religion, Education
and the Supreme Court, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 77 (1949); see also MARK
DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 31 (1965) ("[A]mong the most
important purposes of the First Amendment was the advancement of the interests of
religion."); Arthur Sutherland, Jr., Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L.
REV. 1306, 1318 (1949) (The history of church and state reveals "an intimate associa-
tion between government and religion.").
' Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2185 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
9 See RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1, at 3-5.
"0 See id. at 12-14.
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understanding of the relationship between religion and the national govern-
ment. Drawing on early legal sources, Adams argued that in adopting the
Establishment Clause the Framers did not intend for government to break all
ties with religion, but only to prevent preference from being shown to any
particular Christian sect. 1
Adams perceived four "interests" as critical to the dynamic of American
culture and society: peace, intellect and education, religion and morality, and
pecuniary well-being. 2 Adams viewed religion as the most important of
these interests because it was grounded in the founding values of the colo-
nies and evidenced by the special protection afforded religion and religious
conscience in the First Amendment. 3 In his view, the First Amendment
charted a course that under the Establishment Clause prohibited governmen-
tal preferences among religious sects and under the Free Exercise Clause
protected freedom of conscience. What Adams lamented in 1833, and the
motivating reason for his sermon, was what he perceived to be the degrada-
tion and waning influence of religion among government leaders and in the
community at large. 4
Adams argued that the "disconnect" between law and the prevalent
moral standard (Christianity) threatened the foundation of civil society. 5 In
his view, the glue of society was not the force of government or even the
force of reason embodied in the documents founding the republic, but, rath-
er, the shared religious and moral values of the people. 6 These values,
which at the time were rooted principally in Christianity, provided order
where the force of the state failed or where the state was otherwise incapa-
ble of providing order. Adams believed that the failure of officials to affirm
and nurture this essential, shared foundation through benevolence to religion
sowed seeds that would yield a harvest of moral breakdown, threatening
individual freedom and, ultimately, the freedom of society in general. In
Adams's words:
By excluding a Supreme Being, a superintending Providence,
and a future state of rewards and punishments, as much as
possible, from the minds of men, it will destroy all sense of
moral responsibility; for, the lively impression of an omni-
present Ruler of the Universe and a strong sense of moral
obligation, have, in the history of mankind, always accom-
panied each other; and whenever the former has been weak-
'1 See RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 1, at 46.
See id. at 49 n.26.
13 See id. at 49.
14 See id.
'5 See id.
16 See id. at 49-51.
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ened, it has never failed to be followed by a corresponding
moral declension.
17
Adams viewed the Constitution as a nonpreferentialist political document
favoring religion in general, but prohibiting government from favoring any
one religious sect and providing freedom of conscience for all. Because of
the diversity among established churches and Christian sects in Colonial
America, the Framers were indeed establishing a framework of government
that of necessity required a "neutral" course among religious sects.' Thus,
the Declaration of Independence could speak boldly of the Creator's endow-
ment of certain inalienable rights, and the Constitution could include neutral
references to religion. The Constitution was dated with reference to the birth
of Christ ("in the year of our Lord"), as well as with the year of American
independence." It also acknowledged the importance of the Sabbath by
extending the President's time limit to veto bills.2' The Free Exercise
Clause protected rights of conscience, permitting religion to flourish.2' The
Establishment Clause restrained Congress from making any "change in the
religion of the country," something which Adams regarded as "too delicate
and too important a subject to be entrusted to their guardianship."' Consti-
tutional provisions in the states continued in effect, "not only recognizing
the Christian religion, but affording it countenance, encouragement and
protection." 23 For example, religious tests were excluded as a requirement
for holding political office, which is also the case in the Federal Constitu-
tion. The failure to express more sympathy to religion in the Constitution,
however, was in Adam's view by design, just as the Constitution left unstat-
ed other fundamental truths, such as the inalienable rights of the people, the
political sovereignty of the people, and the right of the people to resist and
abolish tyranny.'
II. THE DISPUTE-REACrIONS TO ADAMS'S VIEWS
The reaction to Adams's views was immediate and varied. John Mar-
shall complimented Adams for giving "full influence" to the tense duality of
official respect for religion and official protection of freedom of con-
17 Id. at 56 (quoting Jasper Adams).
18 See id. at 46-47.
19 See Jasper Adams, Notes to The Relation of Christianity to Civil Government
[hereinafter Sermon Notes], in RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1, at 59, 63.
'2 See id. at 63-64.
21 See RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 1, at 46-47.
22 Id.
Sermon Notes, supra note 19, at 61-63.
See generally U.S. CONST.
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science.' Marshall allowed that "the object of the colonial charters was
avowedly the propagation of the Christian faith" and indicated that it would
be strange, in a nation whose population was "entirely Christian," if "our in-
stitutions did not presuppose Christianity, [and] did not often refer to it,
[and] exhibit relations with it."'
Joseph Story and James Madison commented more extensively, though
in predictably different directions. Story, then an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court and later a professor of law at Harvard, shared Adams's
nonpreferentialist views in that he generally thought that "Christianity [was]
indispensable to the true interests [and] solid foundations of all free govern-
ments," but abjured preference toward any sect.27 Story confessed that he
looked "with no small dismay upon the rashness [and] indifference with
which the American people seem in our day to be disposed to cut adrift
from old principles, [and] to trust themselves to the theories of every wild
projector in to [?] [sic] religion [and] politics."' Story later wrote at Har-
vard in his Commentaries on the law as follows:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and
of the amendment to it ... the general, if not the universal
sentiment in America was, that christianity ought to receive
encouragement by the state so far as was not incompatible
with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of
religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to
make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indiffer-
ence, would have created universal disapprobation if not
universal indignation .... The real object of the amendment
was ... to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment,
which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of
the national government.2
Story also took issue with Thomas Jefferson's then published sentiment that
the common law did not include precepts of Christianity, writing that "I am
persuaded, that a more egregious error never was uttered by able men" and
' Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 3, 1883), in RELIGION AND
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 114, 114.
26 Id. at 113-14.
27 Letter from Joseph Story to Jasper Adams (May 14, 1833), in RELIGION AND
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 115, 115.
29 Id.
29 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE CONSTITUTION
593-94 (2d ed. 1851). Other nineteenth-century legal scholars have supported Justice
Story's construction. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw 224 (3d ed. 1898).
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suggesting that Jefferson relied "on authorities [and] expositions which are
wholly inadmissible."'
James Madison, in his eighty-third year, wrote to express disagreement
with Adams's views. He felt that government should not support the reli-
gious inclinations of the American people. Madison appealed to "experi-
ence" as the "admitted umpire" of the relationship "between government
[and] Religion."'" In Madison's judgment, "[tihe worst of Government,"
were the papal systems, which wholly unified government and religion.32
Likewise, European governments with legally established churches and
"very little toleration of others" made for systems unfavorable "either to
Religion or to government."33 Writing to Adams, Madison proffered a com-
parison of the five colonies without established churches to those with es-
tablished churches. Madison concluded that the colonies that prospered best
were those that left the support of religion to "voluntary associations [and]
contributions of individuals . . . ."' Madison saw in the latter "greater pu-
rity [and] industry of the pastors [and] in the greater devotion of their
flocks," particularly in Virginia, as between the period during which Virgin-
ia had a state-supported church and the latter period during which it did not
have a state-sponsored church.35 Madison also thought that any tendency
for excess or extravagance by "[r]eligion left entirely to itself' would be
temporary and eventually tempered by reason.' What Madison called a
"line of separation" between church and state would effect "an entire absti-
nence of the Government from interference, in any way whatever, beyond
the necessity of preserving public order, [and] protecting each sect against
trespasses on its legal rights by others."37
The most severe criticism of Adams's work was contained in an un-
signed review in the American Quarterly Review. It urged that "there can be
no middle ground between perfect liberty of conscience and despo-
tism-since to give government power to protect Christianity for instance, is
to give it power to declare what is Christianity, and what is necessary for its
protection-in other words to give it unlimited power."3 The reviewer
methodically disputed Adams's reliance on the evident sympathy to Chris-
tianity of the common law, colonial charters, and state constitutions. Instead,
Letter from Joseph Story to Jasper Adams, supra note 27, at 116.
3' Letter from James Madison to Jasper Adams (Sept. 1833), in RELIGION AND POLI-
TICS, supra note 1, at 117, 117.
32 Id. at 118.
33 Id.
3 Id.
35 Id. at 118, 120.
36 Id. at 120.
37 Id.
31 Immunity of Religion, AM. Q. REV., June 1835, at 319 [hereinafter Immunity of
Religion], reprinted in RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1, at 127, 149.
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the reviewer argued that a careful review of these documents showed no
such sympathy, but, rather, a uniform intent to eliminate established religion.
The reviewer argued the error of governmental sympathy to religion, con-
tending that it "will necessarily create a marked distinction between those
who believe and those who do not believe the religion upheld and protected
by law."39 It would lead to discrimination, the invasion of conscience, and
the demise of other liberties, such as freedom of speech.
III. COMPARISONS FOR TODAY
The original understanding of the Framers has played a significant role
in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning and reach of the Es-
tablishment Clause. In Everson v. Board of Education,° the Court pro-
claimed that the Framers intended to erect a "high wall" of separation be-
tween church and state.4' In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied
heavily upon the historical experience of Thomas Jefferson and James Madi-
son in disestablishing the Church of England in Virginia. The Court's posi-
tion has been heavily criticized. Professor Mark DeWolfe Howe has called it
"pretentious" and "over simplified."42
[T]he Supreme Court, by pretending that the American prin-
ciple of separation is predominantly Jeffersonian and by pur-
porting to outlaw even those aids to religion which do not
affect religious liberties, seems to have endorsed a govern-
mental policy aimed at the elimination of de facto establish-
ments. The Court too often has allowed itself to become
involved in an exercise in scholastic dogmatism-a venture
in the acrobatics of logic which cannot, for very long, have
an important effect on the actualities of American life.43
Howe suggests that separation between the precincts of religion and govern-
ment was not so much a Jeffersonian, as an evangelical principle." The
39 Id.
40 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
41 See id. at 16. The Court relied on its previous holding in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which upheld the enforcement of a federal bigamy statute in
the Utah Territory over a Mormon free exercise defense.
42 HOWE, supra note 7, at 12.
43 Id.
44 See id. at 5. Howe attributes separationism to Roger Williams, a Baptist who was
exiled to and later founded Rhode Island, because he believed government-established
religion in Massachusetts had corrupted true religion. Williams wrote long before Jeffer-
son of a wall of separation, mainly for the benefit of religion: "[W]hen they have
opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and
268 [Vol. 6:1
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Court's choice of the Jeffersonian dialect ignored what Howe labels as the
de facto establishment of religion in America and served to widen "the gap
between current social reality and current constitutional law."4 The Court
also failed, in his view, to recognize more than a century of federalism in
matters of religion and the "common assumption in the first decades of the
nineteenth century that state governments [could] properly become the sup-
porters and the friends of religion.
46
In recent years, members of the Court have revisited the rendition of
colonial history in Everson.47 Notwithstanding Madison's Virginia roots
and his role in drafting the First Amendment,48 revisionists point out that it
took all thirteen colonies and their representatives to ratify the Bill of
Rights. They make reference to written sources, such as state constitutions
and treaties, to contemporaneous and subsequent state and federal govern-
mental practices, including presidential proclamations, as well as to congres-
sional and military chaplaincies and publicly sanctioned prayer in Congress.
Revisionists point out that Jefferson's alleged "high wall of separation," was
the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall itself, removed the
candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day." HowE, supra note 7, at
5. Professor Dreisbach points out in another recent work that other writers have dis-
puted Howe's suggestion that Williams had any influence on Jefferson. See Daniel L.
Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles": The Danbury Baptists, Thomas
Jefferson and the "Wall of Separation," 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455, 458 (1997) ("As for
any direct influence of his thought on the ultimate achievement of religious liberty in
America, he [Williams] had none.") (quoting Perry Miller, Roger Williams: An Essay in
Interpretation, in VII THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 10 (1963)). In-
deed, the "wall" reference may have derived from the Political Disquisitions of James
Burgh, a Scotsman whose writings influenced leaders of the American Revolution. See
id. at 486-90 (1997). Burgh spoke of "an impenetrable wall of separation between
things sacred and civil." Id. at 488 (citing JAMES BURGH, II CRrro, OR ESSAYS ON
VARIOUS SUBJECTS 119 (1767)); see ISSAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM AND BOUR-
GEOIS RADICALISM: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
AND AMERICA 205 (1990). Both John Adams and Thomas Jefferson recommended
Burgh's Political Disquisitions to others. See Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Thomas
Mann Randolph, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 496-97
(1944); Letter from John Adams to James Burgh, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS,
SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 351 (1851).
4' HOWE, supra note 7, at 11.
46 Id. at 28.
"' See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609-30 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
id. at 630-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29-46
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64-84 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 84-90 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 91-113 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 671 (1970); cf. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:
HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982).
4' Jefferson was in France at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted.
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not in the Bill of Rights, but appeared in an 1802 letter from Jefferson to
the Danbury (Connecticut) Baptists.49 To revisionists, the "wall" is not
nearly so high as the one constructed in Everson.
The views expressed today in the continuing debate over the proper
boundaries of the Establishment Clause and of religion in American political
life are as diverse as those expressed by Marshall, Story, Madison, and
others in response to Jasper Adams's sermon. Dreisbach views the positions
of Adams and Madison as more moderate among the views espoused by
strict separationists and nonpreferentialists:
Despite suggestions to the contrary, Adams did not advocate
theocracy (at least not in the strictest sense of the word), any
more than Madison championed infidelism or doctrinaire
secularism. Adams was not intolerant of religious minorities,
and Madison was not indifferent to religion and the concerns
of the religious community. Significantly, Adams and Madi-
son eschewed the extreme positions of exclusive establish-
ment and strict separation respectively. Adams's "middle
course" and Madison's "line of separation" were attempts to
craft moderate responses to delicate political and constitu-
tional questions. Those aligned with Adams and Madison,
however, were often less moderate in their approaches and
rhetoric. Participants in the debate have frequently talked
past each other and often have unnecessarily inflamed pas-
sions and nurtured distrust of their opponents' motives.5"
Dreisbach interprets Adams's motivation as a desire to buttress what
Adams viewed as weaknesses in the requisite moral underpinnings of a free
social order and societal stability, rather than as a desire to establish a na-
tional religion or church. If shared religious values were undermined, Ad-
ams feared that "it [would] be succeeded by a decline of public and private
morals, and by the destruction of those high and noble qualities of character,
for which as a community we have been so much distinguished."'" Like-
wise, Madison had a beneficent motivation, "to promote the best and purest
religion and to protect liberty of conscience from invasion by the state."52
For Madison, "true religion prospered in the marketplace of ideas unre-
" See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association in the State of
Connecticut (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON 281-82 (Albert Ellery
Bergh ed., 1907).
" RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 1, at 152-53.
S Id. at 155 (quoting Jasper Adams).
52 Id. at 157.
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strained by the monopolistic control of the civil authority."53 Dreisbach
points out that Madison abandoned Jefferson's image of a "wall of separa-
tion" in favor of a more subtle metaphor that acknowledged the complex
and ambiguous intersection of religion and civil government: "I must admit,
moreover, that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of
separation, between the rights of Religion [and] the Civil authority, with
such distinctiveness, as to avoid collisions [and] doubts on unessential
points." 4
Today, Adams's proposition that government should favor, or even
endorse, religious precepts in recognition of the foundation of the social
order sounds foreign. Greater diversity in the religious experience of the
American people and forty years of Supreme Court Establishment Clause
decisions anchored in Everson's "high wall" doctrine would make efforts to
carry out such a proposition nearly impossible, if not illegal.55 At the same
time, Adams's prophetic warning that a divorce between government and
religion could lead to social breakdown is troubling in the face of recently
spiraling statistics for drug use and abuse, murder, sexual harassment, child
molestation, family disintegration, and other personal and social ills that
cheapened the quality of life and imputed a tremendous human, as well as
economic, cost. Social dysfunctions of this magnitude require governmental
responses. Under current Establishment Clause doctrine, however, govern-
mental responses must be weighted more toward the application of brute
force than, as Adams would urge, an appeal to religious and moral princi-
ples that "pervad[e] the community, guid[e] the conscience, enlighten[ ] the
reason, soften[ ] the prejudices, and calm[ ] the passions of the multi-
tude. 56
In recent decades, American government has chosen to advance its mor-
al concerns through the appropriation of billions of dollars for public wel-
fare and social programs. These programs temporarily have ameliorated
problems of material want but have been less successful in curing the deep-
er problems of self-indulgence and personal irresponsibility. Recognizing
that the symptoms of moral breakdown require a cure, government in recent
years has resorted to the application of physical force by enacting laws with
stiffer penalties,57 restricting opportunities for parole,5" punishing recid-
51 Id. at 156.
Id. at 157 (quoting James Madison).
'5 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
56 RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 1, at 51.
s See The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 13701-14223 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Federal Crime Control Act].
58 See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-151 (Michie 1994); Brown v. Virginia Dept. of Cor-
rections, 886 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Va. 1995); Fleming v. Murray, 888 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.
Va. 1994).
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vism,"9 incarcerating more offenders,' expanding enforcement of the
death penalty, 61 and appropriating hundreds of millions of dollars for pris-
ons, weaponry, and police.62 This effort may have achieved some success
in stemming the rise in crime rates.63 Will such force, however, prove to be
enough? At what cost to humanity and freedom? Is there any more that law
and government can or should do to encourage a climate in which shared
morality based in religion may act as an antidote to these seemingly rampant
social ills?'
Because current Establishment Clause doctrine restricts government
promotion of moral values associated with religion, there may be very little
that law and government can do directly to encourage a climate of shared
religious mortality, at least insofar as benevolence to religion is concerned.
Jasper Adams undoubtedly would view current Establishment Clause doc-
trine as pitting government against religious belief and exercise. He would
view the present barrier between politics and religion as too high, or perhaps
unnecessary, because it prevents government from drawing upon an impor-
tant, indeed essential, element of America's heritage-religious belief and
exercise-as part of the solution to societal problems. In contrast, Madison
9 See Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Menlo, Three Strikes and You're Out! The Polit-
ical Sentencing Game, in MARILYN MCSHANE & FRANK R. WILLIAMS III, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 89 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
60 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORREC-
TIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995 Table 1.9, at 8.
6' See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report (1990): United States of
America, in MARGERY B. KOSSED, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE PHILOSOPHICAL MORAL
AND PENOLOGICAL DEBATE OVER CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 451 (1996); Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death
Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra, at 486.
612 See 1994 Federal Crime Control Act, supra note 57; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT Ex-
TRACTS, 1990, at 2 tbl. 2, 6 tbl. 7.
63 See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Press Release,
Crime in the United States 1996 (Oct. 4, 1997). The F.B.I. states in releasing its final
1996 Uniform Crime Reporting Program statistics that the volume of serious reported
crime declined 3% in 1996. Violent crime dropped 6%, and property crime 2%. The
Crime Index Rate of 5,079 offenses per 100,000 United States inhabitants was 4%
below the 1995 rate. See id.
The relationship between positive law and shared societal values is, of course,
interrelated. The law appropriates values to fashion social character. Indeed, "Aristotle
believed that the repetitive conduct that forms habits and builds character is traceable,
directly or indirectly, to the laws." Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republi-
can-Oriental Legal Theory and the Moral Foundations of Deliberative Democracy, 82
CAL. L. REV. 331, 377 (1994). For Aristotle, moral argument without the force of law
is ineffective, especially when people "habitually live a life ruled by passion." Id. at
377.
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would herald this barrier as the beauty of the system, a sort of inverse be-
nevolence. By restraining government from the precincts of religion, Madi-
son would argue that true religion is enabled to flourish and exert its influ-
ence upon society with maximum freedom in ways that a closer relationship
would corrupt and debilitate.
One asks whether these two positions are irreconcilable and just how far
government is required by the constitutional scheme to withdraw from en-
couraging the beneficial effects of religion in society. Was Adams right in
believing that the Constitution does not require government to disconnect
itself from the benevolent accommodation of religion, while preserving
rights of conscience under the Free Exercise Clause?
Relying mainly on political theory, the prevalent sentiment in the mod-
em legal academy is generally "that law ought to be conducive to the reli-
gious experience and expression of its citizenry," but only if it operates
"independent of the particular belief systems within society."65 Dreisbach
does not debate this sentiment, as such, but suggests that the modem lines
of separation drawn by the Supreme Court have perhaps inhibited religious
influences upon society now more than in the founding days of the repub-
lic.' In doing so, he cautions against the temptation "to impose twentieth-
century values on eighteenth-century text" or "to view the actions of the
framers through a secular lens."'67 He suggests that the answer to the ques-
tion of the proper line of separation between church and state lies not so
much in the text or the actions of the Framers, but in the federalism of the
governmental system adopted in 1789."
The principal government at the time of the framing of the Bill of
Rights was state government. In most states, laws and practices that would
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path: Separating Law and
Religion In the Secular State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1095 (1986). A sampling of
the diversity of views in the academy's church-state debate may be seen in HAROLD
JOSEPH BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1974); David S. Caudill,
Pluralism and the Quality of Religious Discourse in Law and Politics, 6 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 135 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of
Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1011 (1986); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice: Some
Further Thoughts, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1019 (1990); Gary C. Leedes, Rawls's Exces-
sively Secular Political Conception, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1083 (1993); Yehuda Mirsky,
Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986); Michael J.
Perry, A Critique of the "Liberal" Political-Philosophical Project, 28 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 25 (1987); and Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation or Reli-
gion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1988).
6 Daniel L. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian
Religion in the United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 927, 999 (1996).
67 Id.
68 See id at 997-99.
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today be deemed an establishment of religion were widespread.6 , In all
states, religion played a significant role in their affairs.70 The new federal
government, as Professor Stephen Botein has observed, was designed for
certain general purposes:
It did not police or educate; it did not embody the immediate
will of the people. Compared with the governments of the
several states, conceivably it was too distant from the citi-
zenry and too restricted in the scope of its responsibility to
require an official religious dimension. By the very nature of
its limitations, it did not have to be directly associated with
"sacred things." It was not so much that church and state had
to be separated at the federal level, then, as that there was no
federal state to be kept separate.7'
The future would be handled by the Establishment Clause, which would
protect against the establishment of a national religion, and by the Free
Exercise Clause, which would guarantee the rights of conscience. The new
national government was, in Dreisbach's words, "fragile and uncertain, and
the framers no doubt thought it imprudent to address a subject the states
jealously guarded." '72 Existing state constitutions would continue to define
the importance and nature of the interrelationships between religion and
government.73 As Elizabeth Clark has written:
The puzzling silence of the federal constitution makes more
sense if seen in this light: one important function of the First
Amendment was to restrain the federal government's power
to interfere with state regulation of religion. The state was
the appropriate overseer of religion under the federal system,
and states were assumed to have been left free to establish,
disestablish, or partially establish religion as they saw fit.74
69 See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 105-07, 218-21. (1986).
70 See id. at 218-21.
Stephen Botein, Religious Dimensions of the Early American State, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
315, 322 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
7 Dreisbach, supra note 66, at 998.
3 See HOWE, supra note 7, at 29-31; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct.
2157 (1997).
4 Elizabeth B. Clark, Church-State Relations in the Constitution-Making Period, in
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA: A BIBILOGRAPHICAL GUIDE: THE COLONIAL AND
EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD 157 (John F. Wilson ed., 1986).
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In effect, the Constitution's reservation of powers to the states recognized
the diversity of the colonial religious experiences, which included, in some
instances, a close union between government and religion.
This all changed in the middle of this century, however, with the Su-
preme Court's incorporation and enforcement, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, of important provisions of the Bill of Rights. The 1947
Everson case effected a profound shift of power premised upon what Profes-
sor Howe has described as "the blunt and undocumented assumption that
when the nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment it was the people's
purpose to outlaw all state laws respecting an establishment of religion, even
those which do not appreciably affect property, liberty or equality."'75
Whereas before Everson the states had been free to define church-state rela-
tionships, Everson withdrew from "the states the ability to define church-
state relationships within their own jurisdictions., 76 More importantly,
Everson, in effect, subjected the states to a uniform national regime of law
expounded by the Supreme Court. Prior to Everson, there were few, if any,
Establishment Clause decisions in any of the federal courts. After Everson,
they have become legion. Lower court judges, lawyers, commentators, and
government officials must now read the tea leaves of the United States
Reports quite literally to discern the height, length, and depth of what Jus-
tice Jackson once predicted would be, and has now become, the "serpentine
wall" dividing church and state.' The power of elected government to act
benevolently toward religion and the moral values associated with it, once
geared more loosely to standards prevalent in the communities of the states,
is now bound by a straitjacket of judicial doctrine that has become in-
creasingly indecipherable because of shifting divisions on the Court.8
The only remaining role for elected government apart from designating
forums for speech of all kinds, is to outlaw religious discrimination, and
even that, the Supreme Court suggests, must be limited strictly to clearly
defined remedial purposes.79
If, as Adams and others suggest, there are principles in our society's
religions that "guid[e][ ] the conscience, enlighten[ ] the reason, soften[ ]
the prejudices, and calm[ ] the passions of the multitude,"8 then the Su-
preme Court's doctrinal choices in the last fifty years between benevolent
75 HOWE, supra note 7, at 172.
76 Dreisbach, supra note 66, at 999.
7 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995).
71 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Westside Community Bd.
of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
80 RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 1, at 51.
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accommodation 8 nondiscrimination and coercion,82 purpose, effect, and
entanglement, 3 endorsement, and hermetic separation 5 assume a
unique and critical significance in our constitutional system. If Adams is
right, those doctrinal choices may even determine whether society will have
more prisons or more schools.
8" See Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n., 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dept.
of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
82 See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
83 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1310 (1997); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
See County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
85 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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